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Following its devas-
tating defeat in World War II, Japan enacted its so-called peace constitution.
The constitution severely restricts Japan’s use of force, relegating the coun-
try to a minimal military role in the world.1 In the last decade, however, Japan
has increasingly employed its military overseas. In November 2001, the
Japanese government dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to
the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations against Afghanistan. Af-
ter the major battles of the Iraq War ended in 2003, it sent the Ground and Air
Self-Defense Forces (GSDF and ASDF) to Iraq as part of the U.S. “coalition of
the willing.” More recently, in March 2009, it dispatched the MSDF to the
Somali coast to protect vessels from pirates. Such actions would have been un-
thinkable during the Cold War, and they symbolize Japan’s dramatically
changed attitude toward overseas military involvement.
The transformation of Japan’s security policy began in the mid-1990s. In
April 1996, Japan reconªrmed its strong commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance
by announcing the U.S.-Japan Security Joint Declaration. In September 1997, it
adopted the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines to clarify its role and missions
with regard to military contingencies around Japan and adjacent areas. In 2005
Japan agreed to take signiªcant steps to enhance U.S.-Japan joint military
operability by hosting the U.S. Army’s 1st Command Division at Camp Zama,
near Tokyo, and by deploying the Air Force Command of the SDF to the U.S.
Yokota Base.2 In January 2007, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was elevated
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1. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis-
putes.” This means that Japan cannot possess or use force except for strictly defensive purposes,
according to the Japanese government’s interpretation.
2. Masahiko Hisae, Beigun Saihen: Nichi-Bei “Himitsu Kosho” de Naniga Attaka [Reorganization of
U.S. forces: What happened in the U.S.-Japan “secret negotiations?”] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005); and
Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Domei Henbo: Nichi-Bei Ittaika no Hikari to Kage [Alliance metamorphosed: The
bright and dark sides of the increasing interoperability of the U.S.-Japan alliance] (Tokyo: Nihon
Keizai Shinbunsha, 2007).
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to the ministry of defense, and the SDF assumed overseas military operations
as one of its main missions, which until then had been restricted to defense of
the homeland. These developments pose the following questions. First, what
explains Japan’s restrained security policy during the Cold War period? Sec-
ond, why has Japan assumed a more active military role overseas in the last
decade?
Realists such as Christopher Hughes attribute Japan’s new security activism
to an increase in regional threats, including China’s rise and North Korea’s de-
velopment of nuclear weapons,3 but these do not explain Japan’s lack of activ-
ism before the mid-1990s. Indeed, Japan’s post–World War II security policy
has been considered an anomaly from the realist perspective. Realists predict
that in an anarchic international system, states seek to increase their relative
capabilities to enhance their military power and security. This thinking led
some realists to predict that Japan will eventually develop a nuclear arsenal.4
From that perspective, its reluctance to do so thus far is incomprehensible, if
not irrational.
Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that Japan’s security norms ex-
plain its reluctance to engage militarily abroad. Thomas Berger and Peter
Katzenstein, for example, maintain that in the wake of defeat in World War II,
the Japanese developed a strong antimilitarist norm, eschewing policies that
could revive Japanese militarism.5 This logic may account for Japan’s reluc-
tance to send its military overseas during the Cold War, but it leaves open the
question of Japan’s recent shift to a more active security policy.
This article addresses the shortcomings of both the realist and constructivist
explanations for Japanese security policy by reexamining Japanese antimilitar-
ism. Realists and constructivists alike accept the concept of Japanese antimili-
tarism uncritically, although they disagree on its signiªcance.6 In contrast,
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Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 66–69. See also Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New
Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 37.
5. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National
Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). Other im-
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Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1998); and Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics,
Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008).
6. The question of the nature and sources of antimilitarism was also put forward by Peter
Liberman, “Ties That Bind: Will Germany and Japan Rely Too Much on the United States?” Secu-
rity Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 101, 129; and Akitoshi Miyashita, “Where Do
Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Paciªsm,” International Relations of the Asia-
Paciªc, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 99–120.
I argue that Japanese antimilitarism is not a monolithic concept. Rather, it
consists of three elements: paciªsm, antitraditionalism, and the fear of en-
trapment. Only by understanding the inºuence of these three elements is it
possible to explain both Japan’s past reluctance to play a military role overseas
and its increasing activism over the last decade. Simply put, the existing re-
search on Japanese antimilitarism suffers from what methodologists call
“model misspeciªcation.”
This article makes three contributions to understanding postwar Japanese
security policy and international politics in general. First, it demonstrates that
the fear of entrapment—a state’s concern that its commitments to an ally may
drag that state into an unnecessary conºict7—has been a constitutive element
of Japan’s so-called antimilitarism. This ªnding challenges those construc-
tivists who regard Japanese antimilitarism merely as a normative factor, as the
fear of entrapment is considered a realist factor. It also demonstrates that ana-
lytical eclecticism is crucial for understanding the true nature of constraints on
Japan’s security policy.8 Second, it shows that domestic political norms, even
though not directly related to security issues, can affect a state’s security pol-
icy. When Berger and Katzenstein argue that Japan’s antimilitarist norm con-
strains its external behavior, their underlying assumption is that a norm that
constrains a state’s security policy must be a security norm.9 This study sug-
gests that although Japan’s antitraditionalist norm, which reºects the Japanese
people’s desire for mature democracy, has been associated primarily with
Japanese domestic politics, it has nonetheless had an impact on Japanese secu-
rity policy. Third, the article highlights what Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink call “strategic social construction,” that is, the rational behavior of
normative agents.10 In the case of Japan, paciªsts sometimes succeeded in con-
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Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
10. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
straining Japanese security policy by appealing to the public’s fear of entrap-
ment and to antitraditionalism. In particular, paciªsts’ manipulation of the fear
of entrapment suggests that just as rational actors use norms to achieve their
goals, normative agents seek to maximize the appeal of their ideals by incorpo-
rating realist factors into their strategies.
After reviewing the constructivist-realist debate on Japanese security policy,
I provide a model (hereafter called the “hybrid model”) that illustrates how
paciªsm, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment constitute Japan’s
antimilitarist tradition. I then offer four case studies as evidence of how the hy-
brid model explains Japan’s security policy decisions. Finally, I summarize the
case studies and discuss implications of this research for Japan’s security pol-
icy and international politics.
The Debate over Japan’s Antimilitarism
Over the years, Japan’s post–World War II security policy has been the subject
of heated scholarly debate. For constructivists, it provides signiªcant support-
ing evidence for their claims regarding Japan’s strong antimilitarist tradition.
Constructivists argue that ideational factors explain Japan’s reluctance to de-
velop military power, including nuclear weapons. Berger and Katzenstein
have conducted extensive empirical analyses to support this claim.11 Accord-
ing to Berger, Japanese policymakers are constrained by their country’s anti-
militarist norm.12 Both Berger and Katzenstein argue that this norm originated
in Japan’s disastrous defeat in World War II: because the Japanese people con-
sider their military leaders the main culprits in bringing their nation to near
ruin by pursuing an expansionist policy, they began to stigmatize military au-
thority, which they continue to view with deep skepticism.
According to constructivists, the inºuence of Japan’s antimilitarist norm is
particularly evident in two aspects of its security policy. The ªrst is the timing
of the consolidation of Japan’s centrist security policy, or the so-called Yoshida
Doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of Japan’s economic development
and acceptance of the U.S. security umbrella. Berger argues that the doctrine
began to solidify in 1960, when controversy concerning proposed revisions to
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty led to an unprecedented level of public protest
against the Japanese government. He considers this incident “a deªning mo-
International Security 35:2 126
Change,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 909–911. Finnemore and
Sikkink call such agents “norm entrepreneurs.” Ibid., pp. 893, 985–899.
11. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; and Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security.
12. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 15.
ment in the development of Japan’s new political-military culture,” as then
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s “defeat led to a consolidation of the low-key,
minimalist approach to defense and national security.”13 Kishi, a supporter of
revising the treaty, resigned in the wake of the protests.
The second aspect that constructivists highlight involves the institutional
constraints imposed on Japan’s security policy after World War II. According
to Berger, the Japanese people’s deep-rooted fear of the military has con-
strained the government’s defense planning and is responsible for the imposi-
tion of normative restraints on Japan’s military policy.14 For instance, the
Japanese government interprets Article 9 of the Japanese constitution as fol-
lows: Japan possesses the right of collective self-defense, but it is not permitted
to exercise it. This interpretation is uniquely Japanese, given that the right of
collective self-defense is clearly stated in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. In addition, Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles—the policy of not
possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into
Japan—has arguably narrowed the country’s security policy options. Con-
structivists note that the adoption of these principles can be explained only
through an understanding of Japanese antimilitarism.
Realists claim that constructivists exaggerate the inºuence of the antimil-
itarist norm in Japan’s security policy.15 Jennifer Lind argues that Japan’s be-
havior in this regard can be explained as buck-passing to the United States.16
Paul Midford and Christopher Twomey maintain that Japan’s security policy
is consistent with defensive realism: Japan avoids a military buildup because
it would trigger an arms race with neighboring states.17 Richard Samuels
and Eric Heginbotham argue that Japan is a realist state that specializes in
“techno-nationalism,” a nationalistic desire for self-sufªciency and excellence
in technology for the purpose of enhancing national security.18 These realist ar-
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this incident. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 2–3, 30, 58.
14. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, pp. 50–52, 194.
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Japanese security policy. J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitu-
tional Reform in Japan (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Press, 2005); and Tomohito Shinoda,
Kantei Gaiko: Seiji lidashippu no Yukue [Cabinet Ofªce diplomacy: Direction of political leadership]
(Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2004).
16. Jennifer M. Lind, “Paciªsm or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,”
International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 92–121.
17. Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies, Vol. 11,
No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–43; and Christopher P. Twomey, “Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer:
Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security,” Security Studies,
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 167–205.
18. Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transfor-
mation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J.
guments, however, do not explain the timing of the Yoshida Doctrine’s consoli-
dation or the institutional constraints on Japan’s security policy.
Japan’s antimilitarist model also has its limitations. First, it cannot explain
the recent changes in Japan’s security policy. Although constructivists might
argue that Japan’s antimilitarist norm is diminishing in importance, they do
not address questions concerning the timing and the reasons for such a
change. Second, constructivists have not detailed the causal process through
which Japan’s antimilitarist norm has inºuenced governmental policy deci-
sions.19 For instance, Berger does not provide context for the policies or de-
cisions that he attributes to Japanese antimilitarism. Although this omission
is understandable given the broad range of Japanese security decisions he cov-
ers over an extended period, the possibility that the antimilitarist norm and its
claimed effects on the Japanese government’s policy choices are spurious can-
not be ruled out. Indeed, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki notes this problem in the anti-
militarists’ interpretation of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO), Japan’s ªrst comprehensive defense strategy developed after World
War II. Although Berger argues that the NDPO was heavily inºuenced by the
antimilitarist norm, Kawasaki, who examined the policy papers written by
Takuya Kubo, a senior JDA ofªcial and primary architect of the NDPO, con-
cludes that the thinking behind the NDPO was inºuenced signiªcantly by re-
alism, and that antimilitarism’s impact on the NDPO was marginal at best.20
In the next section, I introduce the hybrid model to explain more fully the
motivations behind Japan’s post–World War II security policy. I then brieºy
discuss my research design.
The Anatomy of Japanese Antimilitarism
The hybrid model aims to explain why Japanese security policy has been se-
verely constrained in some cases but not in others.21 Rather than considering
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19. For the importance of analyzing the causal mechanism of ideas, see Albert S. Yee, “The Causal
Effects of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 69–108.
20. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” Paciªc Review, Vol.
14, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 221–240. The view that Kubo was a hard-core realist is underscored by
his regard for Japan’s latent capacity to develop nuclear weapons as a means of persuading the
United States to maintain its defense commitments to Japan. Takuya Kubo, “Boeiryoku Seibi no
Kangaekata” [An approach to developing defense capabilities], Ofªce of Dr. Akihiko Tanaka, Uni-
versity of Tokyo, Sekai to Nihon [The world and Japan], http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?worldjpn/
documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html.
21. Although the hybrid model is less parsimonious than the antimilitarist model, it may have
more leverage if it can explain more variations in Japan’s security policy. On the concept of lever-
antimilitarism as a single norm, the model treats it as a combination of three
factors: paciªsm, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment. The greater
the synergy among these three factors, the greater the opposition to an active
security policy. This section analyzes these factors and explains how each is
operationalized.
The study is based on two assumptions. First, the intensity levels of the
Japanese people’s paciªsm and antitraditionalism have remained relatively
constant since the 1960s. This assumption is reasonable because constructivists
argue that once institutionalized, norms tend to persist despite changes in ma-
terial factors.22 The second assumption is that each of the three factors in the
hybrid model does not exclusively inºuence distinct groups of citizens. Al-
though elites and activists may be divided into paciªsts or antitraditionalists,
it is more realistic to assume that ordinary Japanese are inºuenced by all three
factors.
paciªsm
Paciªsm denies any meaningful role for the military and the use of force as a
means to pursue a state’s national interests. In the context of postwar Japanese
politics, paciªsts supported Japan’s complete disarmament, neutrality be-
tween the Western and communist blocs, and the abolition of the U.S.-Japan
alliance. They also strongly supported legal constraints on Japan’s use of mili-
tary force.
Although Berger notes that antimilitarism is not the equivalent of paciªsm,
paciªsm comes closest to what he deªnes as antimilitarism in the sense that
Japan’s paciªsts detest military organizations.23 In the late 1940s, paciªst intel-
lectuals in Japan published collections of writings by soldiers who were stu-
dents when conscripted and killed in the Paciªc War. The writings described
their battleground experiences and the brutality and selªshness of career mili-
tary ofªcers, often in contrast with the writers’ idealism and reluctance to ªght
a senseless war. These publications became best-sellers.24 In 1950 a group of
Japanese paciªsts established organizations such as the Japan Memorial
Society for the Students Killed in the War, or Wadatsumikai, hoping to spread
their antimilitarist views.
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22. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 894.
23. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, pp. 27, 30.
24. Yoshiaki Fukuma, “Sensotaiken” no Sengoshi [Postwar history of “war experiences”] (Tokyo:
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Japanese paciªsts can be divided into two groups. The ªrst comprises left-
leaning paciªsts and includes members of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and
labor unions, as well as Japanese communists. Better organized than the other
paciªst group or the antitraditionalists, members of this group have played a
leading role in opposing Japan’s adoption of an active security policy. The
second group consists of those who genuinely believe in the paciªst philoso-
phy. Intellectuals such as peace activist/scholar Ikutaro Shimizu, liberal
scholar of international politics Yoshikazu Sakamoto, and novelist Makoto
Oda have been among this group’s most inºuential members. Both groups
hold to a strict interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and op-
pose any policy initiative that seems to enhance Japan’s military proªle.
antitraditionalism
According to Joji Watanuki and other leading scholars of Japanese political
ideology, postwar Japanese politics can be described as an ideological competi-
tion between Japan’s traditionalists and antitraditionalists.25 Japan’s tradition-
alists believe that Japan possesses unique social values, such as obedience to
and respect for authority, emphasis on group unity, self-sacriªce, and perse-
verance. They claim that the political and social reforms instituted by the
United States during the occupation weakened these values, and they have
sought to restore them by amending the Japanese constitution. Japan’s anti-
traditionalists have instead sought to promote liberal democracy in their coun-
try. For example, fearing that the traditionalists might try to undermine
Japan’s ºedgling democracy, the antitraditionalists resisted some of their poli-
cies, such as revising the country’s postwar constitution. Although antitradi-
tionalists often cooperate with paciªsts on security issues, their core mission is
to protect and deepen Japanese democracy.
Antitraditionalism differs from Berger’s conception of antimilitarism in
two important respects. First, Berger regards antimilitarism as a security norm,
whereas antitraditionalism is considered primarily a domestic political norm.
In his words, antimilitarism reºects a politico-military culture that “encom-
passes orientations related to defense, security, the military as an institution,
and the use of force in international affairs.”26 In contrast, antitraditionalism,
as deªned by Watanuki and other scholars, primarily reºects a desire to im-
prove the quality of Japanese democracy; security issues become relevant
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for antitraditionalists only within this very broad framework of domestic poli-
tics. Second, whereas antimilitarists blame Japan’s military organizations for
thrusting the country into World War II, antitraditionalists maintain that the
underlying cause for the rise of Japan’s prewar militarism lay in the very na-
ture of Japanese society. The works of Masao Maruyama, the most inºuential
political theorist in postwar Japan, capture this view. According to Maruyama,
the Japanese people’s extraordinary deference and obedience to authority
made Japan’s prewar militarism possible. Even though many Japanese were
skeptical of the militarists’ ambitions, they did little to try to rein them in.27
Given their focus on Japanese society, controlling Japan’s military organiza-
tions is of only secondary importance for antitraditionalists, who prioritize the
need to transform Japan into a mature democracy.
These differences highlight the relative ºexibility and pragmatism of Japan’s
antitraditionalists on security issues compared with its paciªsts:28 although
Japanese paciªsts consistently oppose all military initiatives by their country,
antitraditionalists seek to constrain Japan’s security policy under two condi-
tions: (1) when the Japanese public believes that policymakers, in attempting
to develop a more active security policy, are taking measures that could under-
mine Japan’s democracy; and (2) when the public believes that policymakers
who seek a more active security policy are traditionalists. Otherwise, antitradi-
tionalist sentiment does not exert strong constraints on Japan’s security policy.
fear of entrapment
The third element of the hybrid model is the fear of entrapment, a realist factor
that reºects concerns of an alliance security dilemma.29 Japanese international
relations scholar Jitsuo Tsuchiyama argues that during the ªrst half of the Cold
War, the fear of entrapment signiªcantly inºuenced Japan’s behavior.30 During
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29. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”; and Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 181–183.
30. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Araiansu Jirenma to Nihon no Domeigaiko” [Alliance dilemma and Ja-
pan’s alliance diplomacy], Leviathan, No. 13 (1993), pp. 50–75; and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “War Re-
nunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy,” in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and
Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 59–60. See also Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand
this period, Japan was more or less optimistic about its security, whereas the
United States was deeply concerned about its security in East Asia. In addi-
tion, the Japanese considered U.S. policy toward the communist states as un-
necessarily aggressive, fearing that it might trigger conºict with China or the
Soviet Union.
The fear of entrapment has helped to constrain Japan from developing a
more active security policy; that is, when the Japanese public experiences such
fear, it seeks to pressure the Japanese government not to adopt an active secu-
rity policy.31 For its part, the Japanese government may try to limit its alliance
commitments to the United States. In contrast, when the fear of entrapment is
low, the public is less inclined to oppose the government’s pursuit of an active
security policy.
Levels of the fear of entrapment vary depending on the prevailing condi-
tions. For example, Japan’s fear of entrapment was generally higher during the
Cold War than after the demise of the Soviet Union, given the much greater
risk of global nuclear war during the Cold War.32 Japan was particularly con-
cerned with this risk because of the presence of U.S. military forces in the
country (including the presumed existence of nuclear weapons), making it a
potential target of Soviet nuclear attack. A state may also experience a height-
ened level of fear when its ally is involved in regional conºicts that could
eventually entrap the former in an unwanted war. A state such as Japan that
permits the U.S. military to use its bases invites hostilities. Moreover, a state
may fear entrapment when it regards its ally as overly aggressive and its ally’s
adversary as on the defensive.
The fear of entrapment is mitigated when an ally is not involved in regional
armed conºicts, or when an adversary is considered aggressive while its ally’s
actions are viewed as defensive or otherwise justiªable. Under these condi-
tions, the Japanese government can move forward with an active security poli-
cy without strong opposition. It may even be that the government fears
abandonment by its ally, spurring it to increase its commitments to its ally in
the form of military contributions.33
case selection and methodology
In the following sections, I examine four case studies to determine the ability
of the hybrid model to explain Japan’s postwar security policymaking. I se-
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lected these cases using Jason Seawright and John Gerring’s “diverse case
method.”34 The ªrst two cases, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty controversy
in 1960 and the anti–Vietnam War movement in Japan, represent examples in
which the Japanese government was severely constrained from pursuing an
active security policy. Constructivists regard the ªrst case, in particular, as crit-
ical to the development of Japanese antimilitarism, so it is reasonable to expect
that the antimilitarist model can easily explain it.
The third and fourth cases, Japan’s security policy during the 1970s and its
security policy under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, are deviant cases for
the antimilitarist model because they are examples of Japan’s pursuit of an ac-
tive security policy implemented with limited opposition.35 The former case is
puzzling because external threats, which were relatively modest during the
period of détente, cannot explain Japan’s willingness to increase its military
role in the U.S.-Japan alliance.36 The latter case deviates most remarkably from
the antimilitarist model.
In analyzing these cases, I use the process-tracing method and examine the
contexts in which the three elements of the hybrid model—paciªsm, antitradi-
tionalism, and the fear of entrapment—inºuenced Japan’s policy choices.
Doing so can clarify whether the claims made by the antimilitarist model are
valid or spurious, and whether the antimilitarist or the hybrid model better ex-
plains the outcomes in these cases.37 In assessing the effect of the independent
variables, I examined paciªst and antitraditionalist discourses that appeared
in the Diet or in the Japanese press, and I used public opinion data to meas-
ure the level of Japan’s fear of entrapment or abandonment. I also considered
events that stimulated the paciªst/antitraditionalist norm or the fear of en-
trapment. Whether the Japanese government was able to pursue an active se-
curity policy without serious opposition or was severely constrained from
doing so acts as the dependent variable. Additionally, I examined the develop-
ment of two important institutional constraints on Japan’s security policy: the
interpretation of the Japanese constitution concerning the right of collective
self-defense and the Three Nonnuclear Principles. Because these institutional
constraints are supposed to offer hard evidence for the antimilitarist model, re-
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vealing how they were developed inºuences my estimate of the performance
of the two models.
Case 1: Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960
On January 19, 1960, the U.S. and Japanese governments signed the revised
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. On February 5, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi
submitted the treaty to the Diet for ratiªcation. The treaty met with strong op-
position from the left and even from some members of the ruling party. Op-
position to the new treaty spread and ultimately led to the largest protest
in postwar Japan. Since then, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has
deemphasized ideological issues, such as the revision of the Japanese constitu-
tion, focusing instead on economic development and maintenance of a low-
proªle security policy. Proponents of the antimilitarist model thus consider the
year 1960 a turning point for Japanese antimilitarism.
the limited impact of paciªsm
Although the popular perception is that the Japanese public strongly opposed
the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, this was not necessarily true before
November 1959, when the Diet began discussing the issue. According to a July
1959 survey by the Cabinet Ofªce of Japan, although the majority of respon-
dents had no clear position on the revised security treaty that was being nego-
tiated, the percentage of those who supported it (15 percent) surpassed those
who opposed it (10 percent). Furthermore, according to a Yomiuri Shinbun sur-
vey conducted in October 1959, 46 percent of the respondents believed that re-
vising the original treaty was necessary, whereas only 12 percent considered
it unnecessary.38 The Japanese felt that the original treaty was unfair because it
allowed the U.S. military to intervene in Japan to put down local riots, while
the United States was not obliged to defend Japan in case of external attack.
Hence, the Japanese generally supported revising the treaty to enhance its
level of fairness.
As a result, Japan’s leftists had difªculty garnering public support for their
opposition to the revised treaty. Despite launching a nationwide campaign
with the establishment of the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of
the Security Treaty in March 1959, the leftists failed to energize the public; the
phrase Anpo ha omoi (Security issues are hard to sell) became popular among
Japan’s paciªst activists.39 Furthermore, in the Upper House election held in
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June 1959, the JSP was defeated while the LDP performed well. Moderate so-
cialists, who attributed the JSP’s defeat to the party’s position on the treaty is-
sue, split from the party and established the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP).40 In contrast, Prime Minister Kishi boasted to Douglas MacArthur II,
the United States’ ambassador to Japan, that because the security treaty issue
had been on the LDP’s electoral agenda, the party’s victory was an afªrmation
of the need to revise the treaty.41
the fear of entrapment and strengthened opposition
Two political developments triggered entrapment fears among the Japanese
public and changed the situation dramatically. First, the paciªsts succeeded in
calling the public’s attention to the so-called Far East clause in the revised
treaty. The clause stipulated that the United States could use its military in
Japan to “maintain stability in the Far East.” Japanese socialists propagated the
idea that the clause would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted
military conºicts and repeatedly asked for clariªcation of the deªnition of the
Far East in the Diet. Socialists such as Seiichi Katsumata, Tomomi Narita, and
Setsuo Yokomichi forcefully questioned government ofªcials, who often con-
tradicted one another, and succeeded in gaining public attention, including
from the media.42 On November 10, 1959, socialists’ questioning led Foreign
Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama to comment that the Far East would include parts
of China and Siberia, allowing the socialists to claim that this interpretation
would permit the United States to use its bases in Japan to attack China or the
Soviet Union.43 On February 10, 1960, Kishi himself erred in responding to
questions by Yokomichi and other socialists, saying that the Far East would in-
clude the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait. Kishi’s comment
allowed the socialists to point out that the U.S. and Chinese militaries had
nearly clashed over these islands in 1954 and 1958.44 The socialists’ tactics
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succeeded in strengthening the public perception that the Japanese govern-
ment was ill prepared to restrain U.S. actions that might entrap Japan in a mili-
tary conºict. According to an Asahi Shinbun poll conducted in January 1960,
38 percent of the respondents agreed that the revised treaty increased the pos-
sibility of Japan becoming involved in a war, while 27 percent did not.45 An-
other poll shows that the percentage of Japanese who had become concerned
about the risk of entrapment stemming from the U.S.-Japan alliance jumped
from 15 percent in 1959 to 38 percent in 1960.46
The second development that triggered entrapment fears involved the
shooting down of a U-2 reconnaissance airplane by the Soviet military in early
May 1960 and was equally damaging to Kishi. This incident provided a golden
opportunity for the socialists to once again raise entrapment fears among the
Japanese people. They pointed out that U-2 reconnaissance airplanes were de-
ployed at Atsugi air base near Tokyo and that the U.S. authorities had not in-
formed the Japanese government of their presence in the country.47 When
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev warned U.S. allies not to allow the U.S. mili-
tary to conduct reconnaissance activities against the Soviet Union, the social-
ists argued that the new treaty would endanger Japan. Their attempt to link
the downing of the U-2 to the debate on the revised security treaty led moder-
ate socialists in the DSP to oppose the new security treaty.48
The socialists strengthened their argument by calling Haruhiko Nishi, a for-
mer senior diplomat at the ministry of foreign affairs, as a witness at the Diet’s
May 14 treaty deliberations.49 Nishi had publicly expressed his opposition to
the revised treaty given his concerns over the risk of entrapment, and he re-
peated his opposition in the Diet to the embarrassment of Prime Minister
Kishi. Nishi later summarized his position as follows: “I believe that the revi-
sions to the security treaty pose a grave danger of worsening relations with
China and the Soviet Union. . . . For instance, if the Taiwan crisis were to erupt,
as has happened in the past, or if relations between North and South Korea
were to deteriorate, prompting U.S. military action including the mobilization
of its troops in U.S. bases in Japan, Japan could not avoid joint responsibility
for U.S. actions and becoming a target of China or the Soviet Union.”50 Nishi
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accused Kishi of paying insufªcient attention to the risk of entrapment in-
cluded in the revised security treaty and suggested that parliament maintain
the original treaty instead. This episode indicates that the fear of entrapment
was widely shared not only by paciªsts but also by moderate conservatives.51
It was in this political context that Prime Minister Kishi articulated one of
Japan’s most important institutional constraints on its security policy. On
February 10, 1960, Kishi commented in the Diet on his cabinet’s interpretation
of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. He asserted that although Japan pos-
sessed the right of collective self-defense, Article 9 did not allow the govern-
ment to exercise it. The director-general of the JDA and other top ofªcials
conªrmed that Japan could not send its forces outside Japan to join an ally in
battle.52 Kishi was not the ªrst to offer this interpretation, but following his
comments, it became widely known and accepted by subsequent Japanese
cabinets. In publicizing this interpretation, Kishi sought to alleviate the rising
fear of entrapment among the public.
antitraditionalism and escalation of the controversy
Although the fear of entrapment fueled opposition to the revised security
treaty, it was Japan’s antitraditionalist sentiment that galvanized the anti-Kishi
demonstrations. On May 19, the Kishi cabinet decided to force the ratiªcation
of the revised treaty in the Diet by ordering the police to block opposition
party members who were trying to prolong the Diet deliberations in the hopes
of preventing ratiªcation. When Kishi’s order prompted public demonstra-
tions, the prime minister considered using the SDF to quell them. The authori-
tarian measures that Kishi relied on to secure ratiªcation of the revised treaty
angered Japanese citizens, many of whom joined by far the largest demonstra-
tion in postwar Japan. One estimate indicates that as many as 330,000 people
participated in a demonstration around the Diet on June 18, the day before the
treaty took effect.53 Despite having achieved ratiªcation of the revised treaty,
Kishi took responsibility for creating the turmoil and resigned.
Triggering the anti-Kishi mass demonstrations was the prime minister’s re-
actionary attitude toward those who opposed him; the public feared that Kishi
was reversing the trend toward democratization in Japan. That Kishi had been
a war criminal contributed to his image of trying to undermine Japan’s ºedg-
ing democracy. Rokuro Hidaka, a liberal sociologist at the University of Tokyo,
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called May 19 “the day when a political surprise attack was launched on
Japan’s democracy.” Masao Maruyama asserted that “whether or not to ap-
prove the revised security treaty is no longer a main issue, but the defense of
democracy is.”54 Masataka Kosaka, a renowned scholar of international poli-
tics, noted that Japanese postwar paciªsm alone hardly explains the spread of
the demonstrations, and that the most important factor was the Japanese peo-
ple’s opposition to what appeared to be Kishi’s attempt to undermine postwar
democracy.55 Overall, the antitraditionalists were satisªed with the Japanese
public’s strong response to Kishi’s reactionary methods and regarded the scale
of the protests as evidence of Japan’s maturing democracy.
The paciªsts expressed frustration with the antitraditionalist intellectuals,
however. Ikutaro Shimizu, a staunch paciªst actively involved in social move-
ments opposing the presence of U.S. bases in Japan, claimed bitterly that
“the security treaty controversy began with the agenda for peace and ended
with democracy.”56 Shimizu severely criticized antitraditionalist intellectuals
such as Maruyama for shifting the focus of the security treaty controversy.
He lamented the loss of the great opportunity to prevent ratiªcation of the re-
vised security treaty. This episode shows that although both Japan’s paciªsts
and antitraditionalists contributed to the spread of Japanese opposition, they
did not necessarily share the same goal.57
After Kishi’s resignation on July 15, 1960, the LDP began to downplay
Japan’s ideological and military agendas. As this case study shows, however,
what constrained the LDP was not so much the antimilitarist norm as a combi-
nation of Japanese paciªsm, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment.
Case 2: The Three-Arrow Plan, Okinawa, and Escalation of the
Vietnam War
During the second half of the 1960s, two events occurred in Japan that strongly
support the antimilitarist model. The ªrst was the disclosure of the Three-
Arrow Plan, the JDA’s secret table exercise for U.S.-Japan military cooperation
in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, and the opposition it produced
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domestically. Haruo Okada, a left-wing socialist, revealed the plan in the Diet
on February 10, 1965. The plan became so controversial that it subsequently
constrained the JDA’s contingency planning.58 The second event was Prime
Minister Eisaku Sato’s announcement of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in
1967. Responding to a question from socialist Tomomi Narita in the Lower
House Budget Committee meeting on December 11, Sato declared that Japan
would never possess, produce, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons
on its territory.59
issue framing and the three-arrow plan controversy
Opposition to the Three-Arrow Plan was stimulated by both Japanese paciªsm
and antitraditionalism. In revealing the plan, Okada effectively framed it not
only as a challenge to paciªsm but also as a danger to democracy, arguing that
the plan symbolized the inadequacy of civilian control over the SDF and the
latter’s disrespect for postwar Japanese democracy. Okada noted that accord-
ing to the table exercise, in the event of war, the SDF would suppress Japanese
leftists and the government would take total control of the economy, transpor-
tation, media, and so forth. The plan even referred to Japan’s July 1941 policy
guidance statement, the implementation of which was a prelude to absolute
state control in Japan during the Paciªc War, as the most useful model of social
control.60 Okada argued that the “SDF’s action resembled those actions of
the Imperial military that led to the February 26 Affair,” a coup attempt by
Japan’s Imperial Army ofªcers that undermined Japan’s fragile prewar de-
mocracy in 1936. He claimed, “It is perilous that this kind of militarist system
is being prepared by uniformed military ofªcers.”61 Okada succeeded in creat-
ing the impression that the SDF had embraced Japan’s prewar militarist cul-
ture, reviving the public’s latent fear that the civilian leadership might lose
control of the military. A variety of publications as well as leftist periodicals
featured stories on the controversy swirling around the plan, underscoring its
tremendous signiªcance to the Japanese people.62
The fear of entrapment, triggered by the escalation of the Vietnam War, also
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magniªed the impact of the controversy. It was on February 10, 1965, just after
the United States intensiªed its bombing in North Vietnam, that the Three-
Arrow Plan was revealed. Japan’s socialists effectively linked the plan to the
war in Vietnam, arguing that it could entrap Japan in an unnecessary ªght
with the communist bloc. In fact, before discussing the Three-Arrow Plan,
Okada persistently questioned the Japanese government’s stance on the U.S.
bombings in North Vietnam, trying to frame the issue as an entrapment risk
for Japan. He argued, “Japan was in the midst of rising tensions in East Asia
due to the U.S. bombings in North Vietnam,” and warned that communists
might “attack Yokosuka, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet departed for Vietnam,
as retaliation for U.S. airplane attacks against North Vietnam.”63
Indeed, beginning in February 1965, the U.S. military increasingly used its
bases and other facilities in Japan to conduct the war in Vietnam. As many
as 100,000 U.S. servicemen may have made their way to Vietnam via Haneda
Airport near Tokyo in 1965 alone.64 Other facilities near Tokyo, such as the
Atsugi air base and Camp Zama, served as logistics and repair centers for
combat operations in Vietnam. U.S. bases in Okinawa played an indispensable
role in such operations. For instance, three-quarters of the war materials and
food supplies ºown to Vietnam were sent from Okinawa, and as many as 9,000
Green Berets trained in the jungles around Okinawa.65 In July 1965, B-52
bombers deployed in Guam ºew to the Kadena air base in Okinawa and then
immediately continued on to Vietnam for combat missions, causing a furor in
Japan.66 The increase in U.S. military activities in Japan alarmed the Japanese
public and intensiªed its fear of entrapment. According to an August 1965 poll
by Asahi Shinbun, as many as 60 percent of the respondents agreed that Japan
might become entrapped in the Vietnam War if it continued to escalate.67 An-
other survey shows that the number of Japanese who said that Japan might be-
come entrapped in the war increased dramatically in 1965.68 These data show
that a heightened fear of entrapment among the Japanese public provided the
background for the Three-Arrow Plan controversy.
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entrapment fears, okinawa, and the three nonnuclear principles
After World War II, U.S. forces continued to occupy Okinawa, but with the es-
calation of the Vietnam War, Japanese voices demanding return of the island
grew louder. During the same period, left-leaning paciªsts organized antiwar
demonstrations across Japan. Japan’s largest labor union, Sohyo, organized an
anti–Vietnam War strike on October 21, 1966.69 Also remarkable was the rise of
non-leftist paciªst groups organized by Japanese citizens, such as the Citizens’
Federation for Peace in Vietnam. Led by Minoru Oda since March 1965, the
group held anti–Vietnam War rallies across Japan.
Evidence that antitraditionalism inºuenced the spread of Japan’s anti–
Vietnam War movement is difªcult to ªnd, as there was no signiªcant incident
that would indicate the revival of traditionalism. In contrast, growing fears of
entrapment contributed to the antiwar movement. A public opinion poll
shows that the number of respondents who thought that the U.S.-Japan secu-
rity treaty would endanger Japan exceeded the number of those who believed
that it would protect Japan by more than 15 and 30 percent in 1968 and 1969,
respectively.70 Edwin Reischauer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan at the time, un-
derstood the nature of Japan’s opposition to the Vietnam War and repeatedly
warned Washington of the war’s potential implications for Japan. In a memo
dated July 14, 1965, Reischauer wrote that before the war had escalated, the
Japanese paciªsts’ opposition to the automatic renewal of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, which would occur in 1970, had been ineffective. He contin-
ued, however, that the war had motivated even Japanese conservatives to join
the paciªsts in opposing the United States and that the United States could no
longer assume the treaty would have an easy path to renewal.71
It was in this context that the issue of Okinawa and the presence of U.S. nu-
clear weapons on the island gained salience.72 When Eisaku Sato became
prime minister, he pledged to reclaim Japanese sovereignty of Okinawa.
Underscoring his determination to achieve this goal, Sato visited Okinawa in
August 1965. In November 1967, he and President Lyndon Johnson met
in Washington, D.C., where they agreed to negotiate the return of administra-
tive authority over Okinawa to Japan within three years.73
The agreement, however, did not quell anti-U.S. sentiment among the
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Japanese public, as the socialists intensiªed their attacks against Sato by rais-
ing the fear of entrapment.74 In particular, as Sato began his initiative to re-
claim Okinawa, the socialists focused on the danger that U.S. nuclear weapons
on Okinawa might pose to Japan. On December 7, 1967, JSP leader Seiichi
Katsumata argued that Sato’s meetings with U.S. leaders “betrayed modest ex-
pectations among Japanese.” He accused the prime minister of “entrapping
Japan further into a large U.S. military strategy in the Far East” by having ex-
pressed Japan’s support for U.S. actions in Vietnam. Katsumata went on to as-
sert that “[t]he overwhelming majority in Okinawa concluded that military
bases [there] were not for peace and security but the causes of getting them-
selves involved in war.” He urged Sato to explain how he would deal with the
supposed presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the island.75 In the Diet, social-
ists and moderates, including members of the Komei Party, continued to raise
the issue of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, warning that they exposed Japan
to the danger of nuclear attack from other states.76
The paciªsts’ tactics of linking U.S. nuclear weapons on Okinawa with fears
of entrapment signiªcantly inºuenced the Japanese public. According to an
Asahi Shinbun poll conducted in September 1967, 67 percent of the respondents
agreed that Japan should not allow the United States to introduce nuclear
weapons to Okinawa when the island was returned to Japan. The largest per-
centage of those who shared this belief (19 percent) stated that they opposed
bringing nuclear weapons to Japan in principle. Almost the same percentage
(17 percent), however, said that they opposed the idea because it would expose
Japan to the risk of war.77 These ªgures show that among respondents who
wanted the return of a nuclear-free Okinawa, the fear of entrapment was as
important as Japan’s paciªst norm. Although technically the danger of entrap-
ment in a nuclear war existed for Japan regardless of the presence of nuclear
weapons on its territory, the public regarded the issue as symbolic of the en-
trapment risk.
The above analysis describes the political context in which Prime Minister
Sato announced the Three Nonnuclear Principles. It shows that both the
paciªst norm and the fear of entrapment inºuenced his announcement of
the principles.
International Security 35:2 142
74. See, for example, Upper House Budget Committee Proceedings, July 21, 1966.
75. Lower House Plenary Session Proceedings, December 7, 1967.
76. For example, Ichiro Watanabe of the Komei Party repeatedly raised questions concerning nu-
clear weapons on Okinawa. Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings, December 15, 1967.
77. Asahi Shinbun Yoron Chosashitsu, Mini Yonjunen no Nagare, p. 299.
Case 3: Increases in U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation during Détente
On July 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine call-
ing for U.S. allies to assume primary responsibility for their defense. The an-
nouncement spurred debate in Japan on whether or not it should adopt a more
active security policy. Fueling this debate was the appointment of Yasuhiro
Nakasone as the director-general of the JDA in January 1970. Laying out
his notion of “autonomous defense” as the guiding principle of Japan’s secu-
rity policy, Nakasone proposed several initiatives to reduce Japan’s security
dependence on the United States and to develop more indigenous military ca-
pabilities.78 The autonomous defense concept met with strong opposition,
however, causing Nakasone to be replaced only a year and half later and
leaving most of his initiatives unfulªlled. The antimilitarist model views
Nakasone’s fall as evidence of Japan’s strong antimilitarist norm.79
After Nakasone’s departure from his JDA post, however, Japan began to for-
mulate a more active defense strategy and to assume more military roles
within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Many scholars therefore con-
sider this period a turning point in Japan’s defense policymaking.80 Japan’s
shift to a more active security policy is particularly puzzling from an antimili-
tarist viewpoint, given the country’s improved external security environment
as a result of détente between the United States and the communist bloc.
the rise and fall of nakasone’s autonomous defense concept
A defense hawk and staunch traditionalist, Nakasone had publicly advocated
the revision of Japan’s constitution and the adoption of an assertive defense
policy. Even before becoming the JDA director-general, he had espoused a
need for Japan’s autonomous defense. In 1969 he stated repeatedly that Japan
should increase its defense capabilities so that it could assume primary re-
sponsibility for its defense, while the U.S. role should be reduced.81 Upon
becoming the JDA director-general, he proposed revising the 1957 Basic Policy
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of National Defense to clarify Japan’s primary role in defense of the nation
while seeking to reduce the number of U.S. base facilities in Japan.82
Initially, the paciªsts’ attacks against Nakasone were ineffective. Although
socialists questioned him on the concept of autonomous defense in Diet meet-
ings beginning in February 1970, their questioning lacked the sharp edge that
proved so effective against Kishi a decade ago. The socialists had difªculty op-
posing the concept partly because Nakasone’s ideas, if implemented, would
have led to a reduction in the number of U.S. military facilities in Japan. In ad-
dition, some scholars attribute the weakness of the socialists’ attack against the
government to their miserable defeat in the 1969 general election, during
which they had emphasized their paciªst positions.83 Sekai, the popular pac-
iªst journal, lamented that the weakness of the paciªsts’ opposition enabled
the LDP to pursue a more assertive military agenda.84
Helping the socialists to become more assertive was a bizarre incident that
stimulated antitraditionalist sentiments among the Japanese. On November
25, 1970, the novelist Yukio Mishima and his followers trespassed into the
Eastern Command headquarters of the SDF and tried to instigate a coup by
SDF ofªcers. Although their attempt ended in failure, Mishima’s extreme
traditionalist agenda and his subsequent samurai-style suicide shocked the
Japanese public. The socialists tried to link Mishima’s right-wing group, Tate
no Kai (the Shield Society), to the SDF and Nakasone himself. In a Lower
House Cabinet Committee meeting on December 9, Shun Oide and other so-
cialists noted that Nakasone had personal connections with Mishima and that
the SDF had given favorable treatment to Mishima’s group, which had partici-
pated frequently in SDF activities and training sessions. They argued that
Nakasone and the SDF were sympathetic toward right-wing groups such as
Mishima’s and accused Nakasone of bearing personal responsibility for the in-
cident.85 Although these accusations seemed to exaggerate Nakasone’s ties
with Mishima, LDP leaders became reluctant to endorse the director-general’s
initiatives in an effort to avoid further controversy.86
Even before the Mishima incident, the fate of Nakasone’s initiatives were
doomed because of a growing concern within the Japanese government that
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the United States might abandon its ally.87 As the Nixon administration made
clear its intention to end the Vietnam War, Japan’s fear of entrapment had be-
gun to subside. In its place came growing concerns within the Japanese gov-
ernment about the scale and pace of U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. In
January 1970, Prime Minister Sato told a U.S. senator visiting Japan that
a rapid withdrawal from Vietnam would be undesirable for Japan and
other U.S. allies in Asia.88 In addition, an announcement in July 1970 that the
United States would partially withdraw U.S. troops stationed in South Korea
alarmed Japanese leaders. Soon after the announcement, Prime Minister Sato
expressed his apprehension about the withdrawal plan to U.S. Secretary of
State William Rogers. Numerous Japanese diplomats also voiced grave con-
cern that a South Korean loss in conªdence in its defense capability would be
undesirable for Japan.89
Given these circumstances, conservative Japanese politicians and govern-
ment ofªcials realized that emphasizing Nakasone’s concept of autonomous
defense might further encourage U.S. disengagement from Asia and even
Japan. In meetings on July 23 and 24, 1970, the LDP leaders and cabinet minis-
ters, including those who had supported the autonomous defense concept,
disagreed with Nakasone’s proposal to revise Japan’s Basic Policy of National
Defense. They argued that emphasizing autonomous defense would wrongly
signal to Washington that Japan no longer needed a strong U.S. commitment
to defend it.90
The fear of U.S. abandonment was so strong that Nakasone himself had to
downplay the autonomous defense concept when confronted with the possi-
bility of drastic U.S. disengagement. In November 1970, the U.S. government
proposed a bold U.S. base realignment plan that would have reduced the num-
ber of U.S. troops stationed in Japan from 36,000 to about 24,000 and returned
many facilities to Japan, including those at Yokosuka base, which were being
used by the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet. This plan spurred heated debate within
the JDA; those concerned about U.S. disengagement argued that some aspects
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of the U.S. plan—the return of Yokosuka base, in particular—would seriously
undermine Japan’s security. Others welcomed the U.S. plan to promote Japan’s
autonomous defense. Ironically, Nakasone sided with those worried about the
potential negative consequences of the plan. He emphasized the importance of
the U.S. presence in Japan, arguing that “it was necessary to send a warning
signal [to Washington] in order to keep U.S. forces or to encourage their come-
back.”91
After learning of Tokyo’s position on the future of the Yokosuka base, the
U.S. government informed the Japanese government in March 1971 that it
would cancel plans to return it.92 The Japanese government welcomed the de-
cision, even though the return of the base had been a goal of the paciªsts.
Stating that there was nothing more important for Japan than the Seventh
Fleet, Prime Minister Sato asked the United States “not to reduce U.S. forces
[in Japan.]”93 In December 1972, Tokyo and Washington agreed to make the
Yokosuka base the home port of the Seventh Fleet Aircraft Carrier Task Force.
increases in u.s.-japan military cooperation under the miki cabinet
Despite the rejection of Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept, the Japanese
government began to focus its efforts on formulating a military strategy and
clarifying its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Two developments illustrate
Japan’s efforts to enhance its military proªle. First, in 1972 the Japanese gov-
ernment began to conduct research on the desired level of Japan’s defense ca-
pabilities during the détente period. This research ultimately led to the
creation of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, Japan’s ªrst national
defense strategy since World War II. Second, in August 1975 JDA Director-
General Michita Sakata and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
agreed to create a U.S.-Japan task force to discuss U.S.-Japan joint military op-
erations. This agreement resulted in the adoption of the Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation (hereafter the Defense Guidelines) in November
1978.
Berger regards these developments as conªrmation of Japan’s decision to
continue the Yoshida Doctrine,94 but such an interpretation is a mischarac-
terization of what occurred at the time. First, the NDPO was not a mere con-
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ªrmation of the Yoshida Doctrine; according to Takuya Kubo, the architect of
the NDPO, “[T]he core idea of the NDPO was . . . to enhance Japan’s indige-
nous defense capability.”95 He argued that the NDPO represented an attempt
by Japan to articulate a military role for itself and to develop indigenous capa-
bilities as a way to maintain and enhance the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alli-
ance.96 Second, the Defense Guidelines went even further than the NDPO in
enhancing Japan’s military proªle. They detailed the division of roles and mis-
sions between the U.S. military and the SDF, reºecting an unprecedented de-
gree of operational coordination. For instance, the guidelines included SDF
missions, such as joint protection of sea-lanes of communication, that had not
been envisioned in the NDPO. Moreover, uniform SDF ofªcers formally partic-
ipated in developing the guidelines, and the number of U.S.-Japan joint mili-
tary exercises increased dramatically after the guidelines’ adoption.97 Paciªst
Japanese scholars lamented that the Defense Guidelines speciªed operational
details that had been unimaginable since the Three-Arrow Plan controversy.98
In short, the NDPO and the Defense Guidelines were more in line with
Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept than with the Yoshida Doctrine.99
This raises the following question: Why did these developments not trigger
antimilitarist sentiment in Japan, especially given that external threats, which
would have justiªed an enhanced military proªle, were relatively low during
this period? There are two answers to this question. First, unlike Kishi or
Nakasone earlier, the Japanese public did not suspect the leaders who under-
took these initiatives of trying to challenge the legitimacy of Japan’s post-
war democracy. Takeo Miki, who was prime minister when the NDPO was
adopted, was a moderate conservative who even leftists believed had respect
for the Japanese constitution.100 He also stood out as a man of discipline who
refused to halt the prosecution of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on
charges of bribery, despite strong pressure from the LDP.
JDA Director-General Michita Sakata, a moderate like Miki and hardly a de-
fense expert like Nakasone, played an equally important role. As the head of
the JDA, he advocated improving civilian control of Japan’s defense policy-
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making. Indeed, he framed the creation of the Defense Guidelines in the con-
text of civilian control. In response to criticism from Tetsu Ueda, a communist
who spoke of the resurgence of militarism within the SDF in the Upper House
Budget Committee on April 1, 1975, Sakata argued that creating a formal pro-
cess between the U.S. and Japanese militaries would ensure that coordination
would be conducted under civilian political leadership. He then announced
his expectation that the process would lead to agreement on the roles and
missions of the U.S. and Japanese militaries.101 Sakata effectively took ad-
vantage of paciªst criticism against the SDF to justify the need for enhanced
U.S.-Japan military cooperation. Just as the conservative Nixon did not need to
worry about domestic criticism of appeasing China in his historic visit to that
country, neither Miki nor Sakata needed to worry about antitraditionalist
opposition.
The second reason why the NDPO and the Defense Guidelines did not trig-
ger antimilitarist sentiment and instead allowed the Miki cabinet to seek more
military cooperation with the United States was the weakening of the fear of
entrapment among the Japanese public. As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of
Japanese who feared that the risk of war had shrunk and remained low during
the second half of the 1970s. One reason for this decline was the end of the
Vietnam War. Equally important was the rapprochement between China and
Japan in 1972. When they normalized relations later that year, the Chinese gov-
ernment formally supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, viewing it as a counter-
weight against the Soviet Union. China’s support for the alliance, in turn,
undercut Japanese leftists’ claim that U.S.-Japan military cooperation would
escalate conºict with China and prove dangerous to Japan.102
The Japanese people’s reduced fear of entrapment allowed the government
to enhance Japan’s military cooperation with the United States without stirring
up opposition. An examination of comments by Japan’s policymakers shows
that maintaining U.S. security commitments was on their minds during this
period. Kubo, for instance, argued the best way “to make sure that the U.S.
military would come to Japan’s rescue” was “to strengthen military coopera-
tion” with the United States and “to develop Japan’s indigenous defense
capability.”103 Sakata recalled that the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975
heightened Japan’s fear of U.S. abandonment.104 Japanese leaders were further
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shocked by President Jimmy Carter’s plan to withdraw U.S. forces from South
Korea. The JDA, the ministry of foreign affairs, and various LDP leaders op-
posed the plan. During his visit to Washington, D.C., in March 1978, Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda cautioned President Carter not to disturb the military
balance on the Korean Peninsula.105 Japan’s decision in 1978—the same year
the Defense Guidelines were adopted—to pay host-nation support to cover the
costs of maintaining U.S. facilities in Japan indicates the degree to which Japan
tried to preserve U.S. security commitments.
Miki’s and Sakata’s reputations as moderates and the lowered fear of en-
trapment made it difªcult for Japanese paciªsts to link their cause to either
antitraditionalism or the fear of entrapment. In August 1975, Japan’s paciªst
parties intensiªed their attacks against the Miki cabinet and criticized it for
pursuing a militarist policy.106 In a House Budget Committee meeting on
October 21, 1975, Haruo Okada, the originator of the Three-Arrow Plan contro-
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Figure 1. Japanese Perceptions of the Risk of War Involving Japan
SOURCE: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Jieitai, Boei ni kansuru Chosa” [Survey on
the Self-Defense Forces and Defense], http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/.
versy, again revealed secret government documents—this time indicating that
U.S.-Japan contingency planning had already been systematized without
the knowledge of civilian leaders. Okada claimed that this act symbolized the
SDF’s disregard for the Japanese constitution and the resurgence of milita-
rism.107 In subsequent committee meetings, other paciªsts, including Shun
Oide, a socialist, and Seiji Masamori, a communist, argued that an announce-
ment by Prime Minister Miki that Japan’s security was signiªcantly linked to
Korea’s would increase Japan’s risks of entrapment.108 Ultimately, these at-
tempts failed to stir public opposition to the government’s policy. A public
opinion survey conducted in 1975 shows that the majority of respondents
(54.3 percent) approved of both Japan’s existing defense policy, with its en-
hanced role for the SDF, and the U.S.-Japan alliance.109 Similarly, Asahi Shinbun
reported on December 18, 1978, soon after the announcement of the Defense
Guidelines, that a public opinion poll showed that as many as 70 percent of the
respondents desired the continuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.110
Case 4: Security Policy Activism during the Koizumi Era
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan embarked
on an unprecedented level of military cooperation with the United States. Af-
ter the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Japanese government dis-
patched the MSDF to handle refueling and other rear-area support missions
for the U.S. military in the Indian Ocean, Japan’s ªrst overseas military action
during a combat operation since its independence in 1952. In December 2002,
Japan ordered its Aegis Fleet to the Indian Ocean, despite concern that doing
so might violate the government’s interpretation of the right of collective self-
defense as contained in the Japanese constitution.111
In addition, sometime around November 2002—even before the Iraq War
had commenced—Japan began to draft a bill that would allow the SDF to be
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dispatched to postwar Iraq.112 Following the end of major combat operations,
the Japanese government decided to send the SDF to Iraq in December 2003;
and in the next month, the GSDF was dispatched to the southern Iraqi city of
Samawah.113 The ASDF also provided transportation for U.S. forces from
December 2003 to December 2008. Arguably, this mission was as dangerous as
the GSDF’s mission in Samawah, as its C-130 airplanes, which often carried
U.S. soldiers between Kuwait and Iraqi cities, were under frequent attack from
missiles launched by anti-U.S. groups.114 This was the ªrst time that the SDF
had been dispatched to a war zone, although the Japanese government refused
to admit it. These actions are clear outliers from the antimilitarist model.
The above actions were possible for two reasons. The ªrst was the dramatic
reduction in the fear of entrapment among the Japanese public. For Japan, the
end of the Cold War was followed by a deteriorating external security environ-
ment, marked by the rise of China and the development of nuclear weapons
and missile capabilities by North Korea. This deterioration led to a heightened
threat perception among the Japanese public.115 Figure 1 shows that the per-
centage of survey participants who said that Japan faced a risk of war had
been increasing since the mid-1990s; in 2003, 43 percent of the respondents
said that such a risk was real, the second highest percentage ever. (The highest
was in 2006.) This heightened threat perception reduced the Japanese people’s
fear of U.S. entrapment, leading to their changed view of the U.S.-Japan alli-
ance: in the same survey in 2003, 41.7 percent of the respondents who believed
that Japan would not become involved in a war attributed this belief to the
U.S.-Japan alliance. In contrast, among those who felt that Japan could go to
war, only 18.3 percent attributed this risk to the alliance, and 79.5 percent at-
tributed it to international tension (e.g., threats from North Korea and the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons).116 In addition, after the September 11 attacks,
the Japanese public considered the United States a victim and its actions
against the Taliban in Afghanistan justiªable.117 As a result, 70 percent of the
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survey’s respondents supported Koizumi’s announcement of the govern-
ment’s plan to assist the U.S. military.118 Fifty-one percent also supported en-
actment of Japan’s Antiterrorism Special Act, which allowed dispatch of the
MSDF to the Indian Ocean.119
In the case of the Iraq War, although the majority of the Japanese public felt
that U.S. military action was unjustiªed, many believed that Japan should still
support the United States or risk abandonment.120 According to a Yomiuri
Shinbun poll on March 25, 2003, 76 percent of respondents approved of
Koizumi’s support for U.S. actions, with 63 percent agreeing that Japan had no
other choice. The same poll shows that more than 90 percent felt threatened by
North Korea, with 60 percent saying they felt it was a serious threat.121 What
emerges from these data is that many Japanese considered their country’s sup-
port for the United States undesirable but inevitable if Japan was to avoid U.S.
abandonment on other issues such as North Korea.
The second reason why Koizumi could initiate unprecedented Japanese
military action was because he avoided stirring up antitraditionalist senti-
ment. This is partly because his rise to power symbolized the advancement of
Japan’s democracy; Koizumi has probably been the most democratically
elected prime minister in postwar Japan.122 In the past, the prime minister was
selected through LDP factional politics; under Japan’s parliamentary system,
citizens could only vote to decide the ruling party. According to this practice,
Ryutaro Hashimoto, a former prime minister and the leader of the largest LDP
faction, should have become prime minister. Fed up with Japan’s economic
and political stagnation, however, many Japanese viewed Hashimoto as a
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symbol of the status quo and their country’s old politics. In contrast, they held
a favorable view of Koizumi, who positioned himself as a lone wolf challeng-
ing the LDP establishment. As a result, the LDP’s local chapters and Diet mem-
bers voted overwhelmingly for him, fearing that the party would be ousted
from power if Hashimoto were elected. Excited that their voices had inºu-
enced the choice of their country’s leadership, Japan’s citizens gave Koizumi a
higher than 80 percent approval rating when he became prime minister. As the
people’s choice, Koizumi was given latitude to pursue an active security
policy without raising antitraditionalists’ hackles. Taku Yamazaki, a former
LDP senior leader and strong advocate of amending Article 9, complained,
“Although the public looks at me skeptically when I discuss amending the
constitution, it applauds Koizumi when he does the same.”123
In addition, Koizumi did not stir Japan’s antitraditionalist sentiment be-
cause, after all, he was not a traditionalist. Koizumi did not share the tradition-
alists’ values, and he distanced himself from the traditionalists by pursuing
policies that angered them. In December 2002, for instance, Koizumi’s cabinet
allowed the commission under the cabinet’s chief secretary to issue a report
that recommended the building of a nonreligious national memorial to honor
Japan’s war dead, despite opposition from traditionalists who have imbued
the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine where the country’s war dead have been
memorialized, with tremendous symbolism.124 Koizumi did make frequent
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, but he probably did so to burnish his image
among the public as a strong leader unyielding to pressure from China
or South Korea.125 In fact, Japanese traditionalists criticized his visits as
“mere performance.”126 Koizumi also explored the possibility of reforming the
Imperial House to allow a female member of the imperial family to become
emperor, considered a taboo among Japan’s traditionalists.127
Meanwhile, Japan’s paciªsts had difªculty linking their cause to either the
fear of entrapment or to antitraditionalism. In the Diet, paciªsts attempted
to argue that sending the SDF to Afghanistan or Iraq would violate the consti-
Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism 153
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125. Ibid., pp. 259–260. China and South Korea opposed the Japanese prime minister’s visit to the
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127. Koizumi also forced the traditionalist Nakasone to retire by strictly implementing the LDP
guidelines on retirement.
tution. One of the most common paciªst arguments was voiced by Ota
Masahide, a Social Democratic Party (SDP) member and former governor of
Okinawa, who asserted that Japan’s rear-area support for the U.S. military
would unnecessarily endanger both Okinawa and Japan more generally.128
The SDP was outmaneuvered by the LDP-led government, however, which
played on Japanese fears of abandonment. In March 2003, the LDP and its co-
alition partners established a policy coordination body that emphasized the
need to support the United States on Iraq to ensure U.S. support for Japan on
North Korean issues.129 Immediately after U.S. forces began their operations
against Iraq, Koizumi referred to concerns among the Japanese people about
North Korea’s aggressive behavior, indicating that Japan needed to act as a re-
liable ally to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance.130 These attempts may have
inºuenced the Japanese public, as the aforementioned public opinion polls
suggest.
Summary of the Case Studies
Table 1 shows the results of the four case studies examined in this article.
Overall, they demonstrate that the hybrid model offers a more convincing ex-
planation for the degree of variance in case outcomes than does the antimili-
tarist model. In addition, the hybrid model provides more detailed accounts of
these cases. For instance, it better captures how the U.S.-Japan security treaty
controversy developed (case 1), by showing how paciªsm, antitraditionalism,
and the fear of entrapment inºuenced events at different stages.
Assuming the validity of the hybrid model, one might ask: What is the
causal signiªcance of each of the three factors? First, the case studies
make clear that paciªsm alone was hardly sufªcient to explain variance in the
outcomes. In case 1, for instance, Japanese paciªsts initially had difªculty in
stirring up antitreaty opposition, which grew only after the other two factors
came into play. In cases 3 and 4—Japanese security policy in the 1970s and the
Junichiro Koizumi era—constraints on Japan’s security policy were hardly
sufªcient to stop the government from pushing through its preferred policy.
This does not necessarily mean that paciªsm was insigniªcant, however;
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130. “Koizumi Shusho ga shibushibu Kitta ‘Chosen Kado’ no Imi” [The meaning of the “North
Korea card” that Prime Minister Koizumi hesitantly played], Shukan Asahi, April 4, 2003, p. 34.
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given that it was a factor in cases 1 and 2 (the anti–Vietnam War movement),
the possibility that paciªsm was a necessary condition for constraining the
government’s conduct of security policy cannot be ruled out.131 Moreover,
process-tracing evidence suggests that paciªsm’s signiªcance may lie in its
ability to stimulate antitraditionalist sentiment and the fear of entrapment. For
instance, by framing the security treaty issue in terms of entrapment risks, the
paciªsts succeeded in strengthening public opposition to its revision. Simi-
larly, controversy swirling around the Three-Arrow Plan stemmed in part from
the ability of the paciªsts to frame it both as an issue of postwar democracy
and as an entrapment risk. Although the paciªsts’ issue-framing tactics had
their limits, as shown in cases 3 and 4, it is fair to say that paciªsm contributed
to the outcomes in a way not quantitatively measurable.
Second, antitraditionalism explains the variance in outcomes better than
paciªsm does. Process-tracing evidence also suggests that antitraditionalism
can strongly inºuence security policy. For instance, it contributed to the dra-
matic expansion of the anti-Kishi demonstrations and to the intensity of the
Three-Arrow Plan controversy. Some evidence suggests, however, that antitra-
ditionalism was not necessary for the strong constraints on Japan’s security
policy. For instance, it was a nonfactor during the late 1960s, when the
Three Nonnuclear Principles were introduced. It is also possible that Prime
Minister Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept would have failed even
without the presence of antitraditionalism because of the reluctance among
other LDP leaders to endorse the concept given the increase in fears of U.S.
abandonment by July 1970, well before the Mishima incident.
Third, the fear of entrapment is the most congruent with all four outcomes,
although further research is needed to assess whether it is a necessary or
sufªcient condition for constraining a more active Japanese security policy.
The rising fear of entrapment was a turning point in the anti-security treaty
movement in case 1. It also contributed to the Three-Arrow Plan controversy
and the development of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in case 2. In cases 3
and 4, on the other hand, the low fear of entrapment created a permissive envi-
ronment for the Japanese government to seek a more active security policy.
Further, the ability of the Japanese government to push through active security
measures in cases 3 and 4, because of the fear of abandonment, suggests that
the causal effects of an alliance security dilemma were greater than those of
paciªsm.132 This result conªrms paciªst scholar Yoshikazu Sakamoto’s argu-
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132. In these two cases, paciªsm and the fear of abandonment exerted opposite effects on the gov-
ment that the inºuence of Japanese paciªsm derives from Japanese citizens’
desire to avoid being entrapped in an unwanted war that might be triggered
by the United States.133
In addition, the case studies demonstrate that controlling the Japanese pub-
lic’s entrapment fears was an important reason for the government to create
institutional constraints on Japan’s security policy. Prime Minister Kishi, for
instance, emphasized the unique interpretation of Article 9 to ease the fear of
entrapment. Prime Minister Sato’s announcement of the Three Nonnuclear
Principles was also partly designed to allay concerns that the presence of nu-
clear weapons at U.S. bases on Okinawa would expose Japan to a possible
attack from U.S. adversaries. These are all important ªndings, given that schol-
ars have traditionally considered institutional constraints on Japan’s security
policy the product of its antimilitarist norm.
In sum, the case studies indicate that the combination of paciªsm and either
antitraditionalism or the fear of entrapment may be sufªcient to constrain a
more active Japanese security policy. This is, of course, a tentative assessment;
given that the main task of this study is to evaluate the efªcacy of the hybrid
model compared to that of the antimilitarist model, more research is needed to
conªrm this assessment and to verify the overall validity of the hybrid model.
If future research ªnds that only paciªsm has sufªciently constrained Japan’s
active security policy, then the hybrid model should be modiªed or falsiªed.
Conclusion
Observing Japan’s recent security policy decisions, one might conclude that
antimilitarism in the country is in decline and ask why Japan’s security norm
has been changing. This study has taken a different approach to addressing
this issue. It began by questioning the adequacy of the antimilitarist model and
explored the constituent elements of Japanese antimilitarism. It then pre-
sented the hybrid model to explain past Japanese security policy as well as its
recent trajectory. The results indicate that the hybrid model more accurately
captures the dynamics of Japanese security policy decisionmaking than does
the antimilitarist model.
Assuming that the hybrid model is superior to the antimilitarist model,
what are some of the possible policy implications? As a general trend, Japan is
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133. Yoshikazu Sakomoto, Kakujidai no Kokusaiseiji [International politics of the nuclear age] (To-
kyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), pp. 3–29.
likely to continue to pursue a more active security policy under the govern-
ment led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), even though the DPJ
is deemed more dovish than the LDP on issues of foreign policy. This is be-
cause the DPJ-led government faces the same external and internal situations
that the LDP did. Externally, threats from North Korea, with its nuclear and
missile capabilities, and the rise of China are likely to persist. As a result, Japan
will continue to experience the fear of abandonment rather than that of entrap-
ment, making it feel the need to do more to maintain U.S. security assurance.
The constraining effect of antitraditionalism on Japan’s security policy is also
likely to weaken as the Japanese people’s conªdence in their postwar democ-
racy grows. Koizumi’s victory in the 2001 LDP leadership election and the
change of government in 2009 have transformed the dynamics of Japanese pol-
itics, symbolizing the coming of “normal” democracy, in which citizens can
exert inºuence over the selection of their leaders by ballot and by voice. Un-
der these circumstances, the Japanese people believe that a return to Japan’s
prewar-style of authoritarianism is an increasingly remote possibility. As a re-
sult, the divide between Japanese paciªsts and antitraditionalists will widen,
making it harder for the former to frame issues to mobilize the latter.
At the same time, factors constraining Japanese security policy will remain,
although they will not exert as much inºuence as they did during the Cold
War. Paciªsm will continue to be a factor. The fear of entrapment will not com-
pletely disappear because it is structurally inherent in all alliances. In addition,
the emergence of a traditionalist leader may make it easier for paciªsts to stir
up antitraditionalist sentiment. Therefore, although Japan is likely to con-
tinue playing a more active military role than it did during the Cold War pe-
riod, it is unlikely to become the “Britain of the Far East,” a state that does not
hesitate to conduct combat operations jointly with the United States or even
independently.134
This study also has broader theoretical implications. First, it demonstrates
the fruitfulness of the eclectic approach, which cuts across different paradigms
in international relations theory. The hybrid model comprises both realist and
constructivist factors, and the case analyses shows that it can provide a power-
ful, more detailed explanation for Japanese security policy than either a purely
realist or constructivist explanation. Some may question the complementarity
of the philosophical foundations upon which different factors are based. As
Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil argue, however, different factors and their
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causal mechanisms “can be meaningfully grouped in terms of the implications
of their substantive claims, in spite of signiªcant differences in their philosoph-
ical or methodological foundations.”135 In fact, even within one paradigm,
considerable differences exist among substantive explanations, which is why it
is worthwhile to attempt to combine explanations that share similar predic-
tions across paradigms.136
More speciªcally, an eclectic approach shows that the fear of entrapment, a
realist factor, played an important role in constraining Japan’s security policy.
The empirical ªndings of this study show that the existence or the absence of
factors contributing to this fear helped to determine opposition to a more
active security policy. In particular, the ªnding that Japan’s institutional con-
straints are at least partially the products of the fear of entrapment is intrigu-
ing, as they are often regarded as evidence of a strong normative inºuence.
At the same time, this study highlights the relevance of normative factors in
security policy. It demonstrates that not only security norms but also nonsec-
urity norms can inºuence a state’s external behavior. As discussed, antitradi-
tionalism is a norm primarily about Japan’s domestic politics, but it can
nonetheless exert signiªcant inºuence on its security policy. Existing construc-
tivist research focuses mainly on states’ external behavioral norms, and the un-
derlying assumption seems to be that norms that inºuence states’ security
policy must be security norms. My research demonstrates, however, that this is
not always true, thus opening up a new horizon for research on the relation-
ship between types of norms and states’ behavior.
A second broader theoretical implication of this study is that it shows the
fruitfulness of treating a seemingly monolithic political culture as a coalition of
ideas. This is partly a reason why a nonsecurity norm can inºuence state be-
havior. Moreover, one of the challenges to research on ideas and norms is the
need to account for the variation in their effects despite the supposed consis-
tency of such effects.137 Recognizing that political cultures are made up of dif-
ferent elements makes it possible to explain why these cultures have varying
degrees of inºuence on actors’ behavior. Indeed, an idea is inºuential precisely
because it can appeal to a coalition of groups with different interests or value
systems. For instance, Manfred Jonas demonstrates empirically that pre–World
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War II isolationism was particularly strong in the United States because it ap-
pealed to various ideological and interest groups.138 Similarly, contemporary
conservatism in the United States consists of partially overlapping ideologies,
such as Christian fundamentalism, hawkish nationalism, libertarianism, and
neoconservatism.139 These examples show that a coalition approach to analyz-
ing ideational factors is underutilized but offers great promise for researchers.
Additionally, this approach calls attention to the role of normative agents in
mobilizing ideational coalitions. In the case of Japan, paciªsts used issue-
framing strategies to stir up fears of entrapment and antitraditionalist senti-
ment. This ªnding sheds light on the strategic behavior of normative agents.
That is, while extant research points out that rational actors sometimes use
norms strategically to achieve their goals, this research shows that normative
agents use realist factors strategically to maximize their inºuence.140 This ªnd-
ing validates the claim by James Fearon and Alexander Wendt that “the most
interesting research is likely to be work that . . . cuts across the rationalist/
constructivist boundary.”141
Only by adopting an approach based on analytical eclecticism was I able to
reach the ªndings presented in this article. Indeed, my research demonstrates
that advancement in theoretical knowledge using this approach is possible
despite what some critics have written.142 This is not to deny the value of
paradigm-driven research, but it should be recognized that analytical eclecti-
cism can be a powerful tool to make sense of international politics, which is al-
most always inºuenced by multiple material and normative factors.
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